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The modest objective of this research paper is to provide a general overview of the 
phenomenon commonly known as e-crime or computer crime. More specifically, the 
discussion will center on section 86 of the Electronic Communications Act (ECT Act).1 
The application of the criminal law provisions found in section 86 will be examined. 
Attempts will also be made to interpret the section. As with almost any new piece of 
legislation, interpretation problems may arise. Where this is the case, possible 
recommendations will be made.  
 
Lastly, the paper will focus on some the crimes that are not found in the Electronic 
Communications Act. The main task in this part of the paper is to determine whether the 
common law is sufficient to deal with these new offences. Conducts known as phishing, 
advance fee fraud, identity theft and cyber stalking will be discussed. 
 
                                                 
1 Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
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There is no agreed definition of computer crime.2 A distinction is made between cyber 
crime and computer crime. Cyber crime3 is defined as any crime that involves computers 
and networks including crimes that do not rely heavily on computers. Computer crimes 
on the other hand, are a special type of cyber crime. The term mainly refers to a limited 
set of crimes that are specifically defined in laws such as the United States’ Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act.4 These crimes include the theft of computer services, unauthorized 
access to protected computers, software piracy and the alteration or theft of electronically 
stored information. The crime also includes the extortion committed with the assistance 
of computers, obtaining unauthorized access to records from banks, credit card issuers, or 
customer reporting agencies, traffic in stolen passwords and transmission of destructive 
viruses or commands.5
 
1.1 History of South African ECT Legislation 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Electronic Communications Act, the South African Law 
Commission pondered on whether legislation such as the Electronic Communications Act 
was necessary. One of the questions that the Law Commission asked was whether 
unauthorized access to computers and unauthorized modification of computer data and 
software could be dealt with in terms of our criminal law and if not, whether it was 
desirable to criminalize these activities. The project team considered whether the 
                                                 
2 Buys R (ed.) Cyberlaw@SA: The Law of the Internet in South Africa (2004) 320 See also Van der Merwe 
‘Computers’ Law of South Africa vol. 5, Part 3 (1998)  
3 Cyber crimes are generally made possible by the combination of computers with telecommunications 
abilities 
4 18 USC 1030 
5 Buys (n 2) 320 
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common law crimes such as malicious injury to property, housebreaking and trespass 
could be applied to internet related crime.6 
 
The project team was tasked to investigate the criminalization of unauthorized access to 
computers as well as unauthorized modification of computer data and software 
applications which includes the planting of a virus for example. The project team was 
also tasked to investigate the use of computers to commit offences such as fraud and 
theft. One of the other objectives that the project team was to investigate was the 
possibility of providing for the procedural aspects associated with the investigation and 
prosecution of offences committed by means of the internet.7  
 
The outcome of the Law Commission’s investigations was that electronic crime 
legislation was necessary in South Africa. The project team proposed that legislation 
should criminalize activities such as the unauthorized modification of computer data and 
software, fraud and theft committed by means of a computer. The project leader, 
Professor Van der Merwe, pointed out that if it were not for the problem of legality the 
courts would have been able to extend the definition of present common-law crimes to 
encompass “computer-spawned” criminal activity.8 If the courts were able to extend the 
common law crimes to computer-related crimes, “hacking” into someone else’s computer 
over a network might have been seen as a form of electronic trespassing, and planting a 
                                                 
6 South African Law Commission Computer Related Crime: Preliminary Proposals For Reform In Respect 
of Unauthorized Access to Computers, Unauthorized Modification of Computer Data and Software 
Applications and Related Procedural Aspects (Project 108) Discussion Paper 99 (2001) 5 - 11  
7 South African Law Commission (n 6) 1  
8 Buys (n 2) 320 
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virus program to carry on unpredictable operations in some else’s computer might have 
been seen as malicious injury to property.9
 
1.2 Current South African Legislation 
 
The Electronic Communication Act was borne out of the realization that legislation was 
required to criminalize computer related offenses. The cyber crime provisions contained 
in the ECT Act are rooted in the proposals of the Law Commission. The main focus of 
this research paper is section 86 of the ECT Act. Section 86 states the following: 
 
Section 86 of the Electronic Communications Act on unauthorized access to, 
interception of or interference with data:: 
1) Subject to the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 1992 (Act No. 
127 of 1992), a person who intentionally accesses or intercepts any data 
without authority or permission to do so is, guilty of an offence. 
2) A person who intentionally and without authority to do so, interferes with 
data in a way which causes such data to be modified, destroyed or 
otherwise rendered ineffective, is guilty of an offence. 
3) A person who unlawfully produces, sells, offers to sell, procures for use, 
designs, adapts for use distributes or possesses any device, including a 
computer program or component, which is designed to primarily to 
overcome security measures for the protection of data, or performs any of 
those acts with regard to a password, or access code or any other similar 
                                                 
9 Van der Merwe (n 2) 
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kind of data with the intent to unlawfully utilize such item to contravene 
this section, is guilty of an offence. 
4) A person who utilizes any device or computer program mentioned in 
subsection (3) in order to unlawfully overcome security measures 
designed to protect such data or access thereto, guilty of an offence. 
5) A person who commits any act described in this section with the intent to 
interfere with access to an information system so as to constitute a denial, 
of service to legitimate users is guilty of an offence.  
 
The ECT Act has provisions relating to the access, interception or the interference with 
data. It effectively deals with the crimes of “hacking” and “cracking”. As the statistics 
have shown, these crimes have become prevalent over the years.10 The ECT Act also 
defines computer-related extortion, fraud and forgery. It also contains provisions relating 
to attempt, and aiding and abetting. These provisions restate the ordinary criminal law. 
 
Special interception legislation is also in force in South Africa. The provisions dealing 
with unauthorized access to and interception of data11 are subject to the Interception and 
Monitoring Prohibition Act.12 The purpose of the Act is to both prohibit the interception 
and monitoring of certain communications and to provide for authorization to do so in 
certain circumstances. Offences and penalties are provided for violation of the 
Interception Act’s general provisions. The Regulation of Interception of Communications 
                                                 
10 http://www.securitystats.com/infosec.html  
11 Section 86 (1) Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
12 Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act No. 127 of 1992 
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and Provision of Communication-related Information Act is the IMIP Act’s successor in 
title. However, it has not yet been proclaimed in the Government Gazette.  
 
There are further crimes that are provided for in the Electronic Communications Act. 
These are, among others, falsely claiming to be an accredited offeror of authentication 
products or services13, falsely claiming to be a recognized foreign offeror of 
authentication products or services.14 An offence is also committed when a critical 
database administrator does not take remedial action under section 58 (1) ECT Act.15 
Furthermore, not cooperating with a cyber inspector is also a crime under the Act.16  
 
However, there are important crimes that are not in the Electronic Communications Act. 
These are phishing, advance fee fraud, identity theft and cyber stalking to name a few. 
These omitted offences will be discussed at length in the research paper. 
 
1.3 International Law 
 
The international community drafted legislation to effectively deal with the problem of 
computer-related crime. The signatory states have agreed to the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime (Cybercrime Convention).17 Although South Africa is one 
such signatory, we have not ratified the Convention. The ECT Act and the Regulation of 
                                                 
13 Section 37 (3) Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
14 Section 40 (2) Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
15 Section 58 (2) Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
16 Section 82 (2) Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
17 Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime 23 2001 (ETS No 185) available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm  
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Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information 
Act contains substantive criminal and procedural law provisions that can be found in the 
Convention agreed to by the Council of Europe. The Convention deals with offences 
against the confidentiality, integrity and the availability of computer data and systems. It 
also addresses issues such as jurisdiction, principles relating to extradition, international 
cooperation and search and seizure.18
 
There is Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime. 19 European Committee 
on Crime Problems (CDPC), are a committee of experts on the criminalization of acts of 
a racist or xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. It was found that 
there was a need for such protocol. The protocol defines the following offences: the 
dissemination of racist and xenophobic material through computer systems20, a racist and 
xenophobic motivated threat21, a racist and xenophobic motivated insult22, and the denial, 
gross minimization, approval or justification of genocide or crimes against humanity.23  
The protocol has been open for signature since November 2002. However, it is not in 
force as yet. 
 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)24 drafted the 
Guidelines for Security of Information Systems. The OECD expects states to establish a 
                                                 
18 Cybercrime Convention (n 17)  
19Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No 189) available at 
http://www.legal.coe.int/economiccrime/cybercrime/AP_Protocol(2002)5E.pdf   
20 Article 3 
21 Article 4 
22 Article 5 
23 Article 6 
24 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) available at www.oecd.org  
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new policy or amend existing policy with regard to the protection of information systems 
and networks according to the nine principles in the guideline.25  
 
1.4 Jurisdiction  
1.4.1 Crimes committed in South Africa 
 
The possible problem of the court’s jurisdiction in electronic crime situations has 
been preempted by section 90 of the ECT Act. Section 90 of the ECT Act sets out 
the jurisdiction of the courts in electronic crime cases.  
 
Section 90 of the Electronic Communications Act26 states the following: 
 
1) A court in the Republic trying an offence in terms of the Act has 
jurisdiction where – 
a) the offence was committed in the Republic; 
b) any act of preparation towards the offence or any part of the offence 
was committed in the Republic, or where any result of the offence has had 
an effect in the Republic; 
c) the offence was committed by a South African citizen or a person with 
permanent residence in the Republic or by a person carrying on business 
in the Republic; or 
                                                 
25 Guidelines for Security and Information Systems available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/6/2494779.pdf  
26 Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
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d) the offence was committed on board any ship or aircraft registered in 
the Republic or on a voyage or flight to or from the Republic at the time 
that the offence was committed. 
 
Various factors have to be taken into account in order to determine which court 
will have the necessary jurisdiction to hear the matter. The underlying principle 
which permeates throughout the rules relating to jurisdiction is that the court with 
jurisdiction must be empowered to ensure that its orders are carried out. Section 
90 states the various grounds of jurisdiction a court could have. These grounds 
will be considered in turn. 
 
A crime that was committed in the Republic falls within the jurisdiction of South 
African courts.27 The individual need not be a citizen or a permanent resident of 
South Africa. It is sufficient that the offence was committed in this country. 
 
Section 90 (1) (b) states that the courts have jurisdiction where any act of 
preparation towards the offence or any part of the offence was committed in the 
Republic, or where any result of the offence has had an effect in the Republic. It is 
unclear as to what type of action constitutes “preparation” for a crime. It is 
possible that the wording of the section is wide enough cover situations where the 
plans to commit the crime were made in South Africa. The court may preside over 
a case where the accused prepared the offence from within the borders of South 
Africa.  
                                                 
27 Section 90 (1) (a) Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
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Furthermore, any part of a computer-related offence that is committed in this 
country may be resided over by a South African criminal court. It could be said 
that “part” of an offence could either be planning or the execution of that offence.  
 
Section 90 (1) (b) also applies to situations where the offence committed had an 
effect in the Republic. The court has jurisdiction over the matter notwithstanding 
the physical location of the accused. The effect of the crime may be felt by 
individuals, juristic persons such as municipalities, bodies corporate, companies, 
close corporations and the State.  Examples of impact of the crime could be a 
defaced website or the suffering of losses by a company.  
 
Section 90 (1) (c) of the ECT Act states that the court has jurisdiction over an 
offence that was committed by a South African citizen or a person with 
permanent residence28 in South Africa. The jurisdiction exists notwithstanding the 
country from where that person operates. In other words, the perpetrator may be 
located almost anywhere in the world. If a South African citizen or a permanent 
resident commit a crime that has an impact in South Africa, then the courts have 
two grounds for jurisdiction. One is by virtue of their citizenship or permanent 
residency. The other jurisdictional ground is covered by section 90 (1) (b) which 
states that the court has authority if the effect of the crime was felt in the 
Republic. If the accused has no citizenship or permanent residence then such an 
                                                 
28 A permanent resident is one who has permit issued in terms of the Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002. A 
permanent resident has all the rights and privileges, duties and obligations of a citizen save for those which 
the law or the Constitution ascribes to citizenship: section 25 (1) Immigration Act.  
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individual is covered by section 90 (1) (a) which covers situations where the 
offence was committed in the Republic. 
 
Section 90 (1) (c) grants the courts jurisdiction over a person carrying on business 
in the Republic. This is notwithstanding his or her physical location. The meaning 
of “carrying on business” as it is used in the legislation is of importance. A 
business is defined as almost anything which is an occupation or duty which 
requires attention.29 The voluminous case law indicates that there should be some 
regularity in conducting affairs at a particular place, usually but not necessarily 
for profit.30 In order to “carry on” a business a degree of continuity is necessary. 
Normally, an isolated transaction does not constitute carrying on a business. The 
isolated act of selling, with or without an intention to make profit, is not normally 
regarded as “carrying on business”.31 What is necessary to constitute a business is 
a definite intention to sell and supply something and to carry on similar acts from 
time to time. Alternatively, the acts must be carried out successively with the 
intention of carrying it on so long as it is thought desirable.32 In R v Silber33 
where an isolated transaction was for the purposes of criminal provisions of the 
Workman’s Compensation Act was held to be a “business transaction” as opposed 
to the continuous transactions or activities implicit in the notion of “carrying on 
business”. 
                                                 
29 As per Lindely L.J in Rolls v Miller (1884) 27 Ch.D. 71 (C.A.) 88 It should be mentioned that ‘business’ 
is wider than ‘trade’ See SA Flour Millers’ Mutual Association v Rutowiz Flour Mills Ltd 1938 CPD 199 
at 204; Valkin and Another v Daggafontein Mines Ltd. and Others 1960 (2) SA 507 (W) 
30 Cape Town Municipality v Clarensville (Pty) Ltd 1974 (2) SA 138 (C) 248 
31 Modderfontein Deep Levels Ltd. And Another v Feinstein 1920 TPD 288 at 290  
32 Shaw v Benson, 52 L.J.Q.B 575 at 578 
33 1938 T.P.D 561 at 563 
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The court also has jurisdiction where the offence was committed on board any 
ship or aircraft registered in the Republic or on a voyage or flight to or from the 
Republic at the time that the offence was committed.34 In other words, the court 
has jurisdiction where the offence was committed on a ship35 or an aircraft on 
flight or on voyage between two South African destinations. It also encompasses 
cases where the offence was committed on a ship or aircraft on voyage or flight to 
or from South Africa notwithstanding the fact that the aircraft or ship was not 
registered in South Africa. 
 
1.4.2 Crimes Committed Outside South Africa 
 
E-crimes may be committed by someone outside of South Africa’s borders. 
Assuming that a perpetrator has violated provisions of the ECT Act, the South 
African authorities would have to secure the co-operation of crime enforcement 
authorities in other countries. This would involve the arrest and the extradition of 
the individual accused of the crime. The extradition of the individual is only 
possible where the crime committed by the person is also a crime in the country 
where he or she is currently located. Conversely, if the offence that he or she has 
committed is not a crime in the country where they have taken up residence, then 
unfortunately, that person cannot be extradited to South Africa for prosecution. 
                                                 
34 Section 90 (1) (d) Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
35 Harris DJ Cases and Materials on International Law Ships (2004) 439 states that ships are deemed to 
have a nationality for international law purposes. Normally, a ship is registered under the law of a particular 
state and is then, under that state’s law, both entitled to fly its flag and deemed to have its nationality. 
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South Africa’s Extradition Act defines ‘extraditable offence’ as an offence 






Unlawful Access and Interception 
 
Large and small businesses, government computer networks as well as home computer 
owners have all been targeted by organized criminal syndicates and radical hacking 
groups. Furthermore, fundamentalist hacking activity is rising and has been getting more 
sophisticated over the last three years. A number of hacking groups from Kashmir, 
Pakistan, Morocco, Turkey, Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Indonesia and Malaysia 
are collaborating both with each other and a fringe of anti-globalization groups based in 
the West in order to target international and domestic online assets.36 In South Africa, 
more than 60 websites were defaced on 17 July 2003. This is a new daily record and it is 
significantly higher than that of the previous record of 52 websites defaces in a 24-hour 
period.37 The illegal interception of data is also common and its impact is felt by 
government, businesses and home computer owners alike. The object of this part of the 
paper is to examine the Electronic Communications Act’s response to the scourges of 
unlawful access and interception of data. References to the Cybercrime Convention will 
be made in order to aid with the interpretation of section 86 (1) of the ECT Act. 
 
2.1 General Overview of Section 86 (1)  
                                                 
36 Matai DK ‘Cyberland Security: Organised Crime, Terrorism and the Internet’ available at 
http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/collaboration/lectures/20050210_matai_speech_v1.0_web.pdf  
37 Leggat H ‘Hackers Have a Free Ride in South Africa’ available at 
http://estrategy.co.za/article.asp?pklArticleID=2542&pklIssueID=453&pklCategoryID=131
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Section 86 (1) of the ECT Act is in part a reflection of Article 2 of the Cybercrime 
Convention on Illegal Access. Article 2 of the Convention reads as follows: 
 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary 
to establish criminal offences under its domestic law when committed 
intentionally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without 
right. A Party may require that the offence be committed by infringing security 
measures, with the intent of obtaining computer data38 or other dishonest intent, 
or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer 
system.39
 
The Explanatory Report to the Convention suggests that access may be illegal where the 
perpetrator infringed security measures with the intent of obtaining computer data or 
other dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another 
computer system.40 Under the ECT Act, the issues of unauthorized access41 and devices 
that are used to overcome security measures42 are dealt with in separate sections. Despite 
this slightly different approach, ECT Act still embodies the spirit and purport of the 
Convention. 
 
                                                 
38 Cybercrime Convention defines computer data as any representation of fact, information or concepts in a 
form suitable to cause a computer system to perform a function. 
39 Article 2 Cybercrime Convention 
40 Article 2 Cybercrime Convention 
41 Section 86 (1) Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
42 Section 86 (5) Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
 20
Section 86 of the Electronic Communications Act on the unauthorized access to, the 
interception of or the interference with data states the following: 
 
1) Subject to the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 1992 (Act No. 127 
of 1992), a person who intentionally accesses or intercepts any data without 
authority or permission to do so is, guilty of an offence. 
  
Section 86 (1) of the ECT Act is subject to the Information and Monitoring Prohibition 
Act (IMIP Act). Under this section, a person may not unlawfully access or intercept data 
stored on a computer. The person who authorises or permits the accessing or interception 
of the data may either be a natural person or a juristic person such as a company or a 
university.  
 
The Information and Monitoring Interception Prohibition Act came into operation prior 
to the Electronic Communications Act. The IMIP Act was promulgated in 1992. It is 
arguable that the use of the internet was not as widespread in 1992 as it is today. The 
IMIP Act applies to the interception and monitoring of communication that takes place 
over the web.  
 
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-
related Information Act43 (RICA) is the IMIP Act’s successor in title. The RICA was 
signed on 30 December 2002 and it will come into operation on a date to be fixed by the 
                                                 
43 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act 
No. 70 of 2002 
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President by proclamation in the Government Gazette. Upon commencement, the RICA 
will repeal the IMIP Act. Until that date, the provisions of the RICA will remain an 
academic interest. For the purposes of this research paper, both the IMIP Act and the 
RICA will be referred to.   
 
2.2 Interpretation of the Section 86 (1) 
 
Section 86 (1) ECT Act criminalizes the unauthorized access of or the interception of 
data stored on computers. Data is defined as electronic representations of information in 
any form.44 Section 86 (1) does not seek to protect the physical computer itself but rather 
the information that is stored on the machine or the data being transmitted on the 
telecommunications line. 
 
Likewise, “illegal access” in the Cybercrime Convention covers the basic offence of 
dangerous threats to and attacks against the security of computer systems and data. It 
seeks to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data.45
 
The word “access” as it is used in the Convention comprises the entering of the whole or 
any part of a computer system. This may be the computer hardware, components, stored 
                                                 
44 Section 1 Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
45 Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime Convention available at 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/eu/cybercrime-final-notes.htm  
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data of the system installed, directories, traffic and content-related data. However, it does 
not include the mere sending of an email message or file to that system.46
 
Section 86 (1) of the ECT Act is fairly similar to Article 2 of the Cybercrime Convention. 
Parties to the Cybercrime Convention are obliged to criminalize the illegal access of data. 
Under the Convention, a person who intentionally and “without right” accesses a 
computer system is guilty of an offence. “Without right” means that the owner or other 
right holder of the system or part of it did not consent to the accessing of the data.47 On 
the other hand, section 86 (1) of the ECT Act refers to the intentional access to data 
without permission or authorization. The accessing of data without permission or 
authorization implies that the access to the data was without right.  
 
The ECT Act does not define the word “access” and the phrase “without authority or 
permission”. A question arises as to why the legislature did not define these terms. In the 
absence of such an answer, it could be assumed that the legislature did not feel the need 
to define “access” and the term “without authorization” because they saw them as self-
explanatory. It is arguable that there are varied opinions on the ease of defining these 
terms. An American court in United States v Morris48  for example, rejected the 
defendant’s request for jury instruction on the definition of “authorization” on grounds 
that the word is of common usage and without any technical or ambiguous meaning. 
                                                 
46 Explanatory Report on the Cybercrime Convention available at  
http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/eu/cybercrime-final-notes.htm  
47 Explanatory Report on the Cybercrime Convention available at 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/eu/cybercrime-final-notes.htm
48 United States v Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1991) Recent court decisions have begun to 
acknowledge some difficulties in defining without authorization see e.g. EF Cultural Travel BV, 274 F 3d 
at 582 Congress did not define the phrase “without authorization: perhaps assuming that the words were 
obvious. However, the meaning has proven to be elusive. 
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However, these terms are not as self-defining as they may appear to be. Getting to grips 
with the meaning of these terms is pivotal to understanding the type of conduct that is 
punishable under the ECT Act.  
 
A statute without definitions means that the courts are tasked with finding an appropriate 
definition. A proposal could be made for the courts to interpret “without authority” in 
ECT Act to mean, among other things, a breach of contract that governs conduct between 
parties. The contract could be embodied in the terms and conditions of a website for 
example.  Accessing the website in violation of the terms and conditions would amount 
to access “without authority”.49  
 
 There may be situations where a person authorizes the use of their computer thus making 
the use of that computer ‘lawful’ so to speak. However, being granted permission to use 
the computer does not necessarily imply that there is permission to access or to intercept 
all the data on that computer. Therefore, an accused cannot argue that he or she should 
not be found guilty of an offense because they did not make use of the computer itself 
without permission. It goes without saying that hackers have the ability to access data 
without physical access to the computer on which it is stored. The ECT Act, the IMIP Act 
and the RICA do not seek to criminalize the unauthorized use of a computer but rather 
the unauthorized access or interception of protected data stored on computers being 
transmitted via the telecommunications line.  
 
                                                 
49 America Online v LCGM Inc. 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998) 450  
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The definition of ‘interception’ as it is used in the ECT Act is of importance too. 
Although the IMIP Act does not define ‘interception’, the dictionary defines it as 
preventing something from preceding or arriving.50 The interception may take place by 
means of a monitoring device. A monitoring device is defined by the Interception and 
Monitoring Prohibition Act as any instrument, device or equipment which is used or can 
be used, whether by itself or in combination with any other instrument, device or 
equipment to listen to or to record any conversation or communication.51  
 
The RICA, on the other hand, does define ‘interception’. It means the aural or other 
acquisition of the contents of any communication through the use of any means, 
including an interception device, so as to make some or all of the contents of the 
communication available to another person other than the sender or recipient or intended 
recipient of that communication. It includes the monitoring of any such communication 
by means of a monitoring device, the viewing, examination or the inspection of the 
contents of any indirect communication and the diversion of any indirect communication 
from its intended destination to any other destination.52  
 
Section 2 (1) (a) of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act prohibits any person 
from intentionally and without the knowledge or permission of the dispatcher 
intercepting a communication which has been or is being or is intended to be transmitted 
by telephone or in any other manner over a telecommunications line. 
                                                 
50 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993) 1391 defines ‘interception’ as to prevent, hinder, to 
obstruct so as to prevent from continuing to a destination; to stop in course of a journey.  
51 Section 1 Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act No. 127 of 1992 
52 Section 1 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act No. 70 of 2002 
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The RICA also prohibits an unauthorised person from intentionally intercepting or 
attempting to intercept or authorise or procure any other person to intercept any 
communication in the course of its occurrence or transmission.53 It is also important to 
note that the RICA criminalises the mere attempts to do these things. This implies that 
even failed interception may be punishable. It emphasises the importance placed on 
punishing the perpetrators of the crime whether or not they were successful in their 
outcome.  
 
The subject of unauthorised interception of data is fairly topical across the world. 
Generally speaking, section 86 (1) of the ECT Act, the IMIP Act and the RICA take a 
firm stand against illegal interception. Article 3 of the Cybercrime Convention also deals 
with the issue in a comparable fashion. Article 3 states the following: 
 
Article 3 – Illegal Interception 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary 
to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committee 
intentionally, the interception without right, made by technical means, of non-
public transmissions of computer data to, from or within a computer system, 
including electromagnetic emissions from a computer system carrying such 
computer data. A Party may require that the offence be committed with dishonest 
                                                 
53 Section 2 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act No. 70 of 2002 
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intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer 
system.54
 
Article 3 aims to protect the right of privacy of data communication. The offence that it 
establishes applies to all forms of electronic data transfers, whether by means of 
telephone, fax, email or as a result of a file transfer.55 Likewise, the ECT Act on 
interception applies to data in any form. Interception by “technical means” refers to the 
use of monitoring devices and such like.  
 
The offence in Article 3 relates to the “non-public” transmission of data. The term “non-
public” qualifies the nature of the transmission or the communication process. It does not 
relate to the nature of the transmitted data. Although the data communicated may be 
publicly available information, the parties may wish to communicate confidentially. 
Furthermore, data may be kept secret for commercial purposes until the service is paid.56 
Therefore, the term non-public does not per se exclude communications over public 
networks.57 Likewise, section 86 (1) of the ECT Act seeks to protect data that is 
generated by any person be it a company, government or an individual. The ECT Act also 
seems to recognize that these persons should opt to divulge their data or information 
when it suits them. Illegal access or interception of the data is therefore a punishable 
offence. 
                                                 
54 Article 3 Cybercrime Convention   
55 Explanatory Report on Cybercrime Convention available at  
http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/eu/cybercrime-final-notes.htm
56 Take for example Pay-TV. 




2.3 Elements of the crime
 
2.3.1 Intention  
 
The ECT Act refers to the intentional access or interception of data without 
authority or permission to do so. Criminal law recognizes that there are different 
types of ‘intention’. Some of these are dolus directus, dolus indirectus and dolus 
eventualis. Dolus directus is present where the accused’s aim and object was to 
carry out the unlawful act or to cause the consequence even though the chance of 
its resulting was small.58 Dolus indirectus is where, although it is not the 
accused’s aim and object, he or she foresaw the unlawful act or consequence as 
certain, or as substantially certain.59 Dolus eventualis exists where the accused 
does not mean to bring about the unlawful circumstances or to cause the unlawful 
consequence which follows from his or her conduct. However, he or she foresees 
the possibility of the circumstance existing or the consequence ensuing and 
proceeds with his or her conduct.60
 
The use of the word ‘intention’ in a statute indicates the requirement of dolus.61 
However, the use of the word ‘intention’ does not necessarily imply that dolus 
                                                 
58 Burchell J and Milton J Principles of Criminal Law (1997) 301 
59 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 301 
60 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 302 
61 In S v Nxumalo 1993 (3) SA 456 (O) (1993 (1) SACR 743) the Court concluded that mens rea in the 
form of intention was required for a contravention of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, since the statute 
resembled the common-law crimes of theft and fraud which could not be perpetrated negligently. 
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eventualis will be sufficient for liability. Certain offences created by statute have 
been held to require dolus directus rather than dolus eventualis.62   
 
Although the ECT Act specifically requires intention for the act to be a 
punishable offense there appears to be no indication of what type of intention is 
required. An argument could be made for the scope of the intention to cover those 
people who go out of their way to cause the unlawful consequence. On a plain 
reading of the text, dolus directus should be the standard of intention that the 
courts could use. It could be argued that any other type of intention could lead to 
absurd results that could not have been the intention of the legislature. Take for 
example an innocent employee who is granted permission to make use of his 
superior’s computer. In this particular work environment, access to certain data is 
restricted because of workplace policy. If for some reason, other than the 
employee’s direct intention, the protected data pops up on the screen, the courts 
may find the employee guilty of an offense if the court used either dolus 
indirectus or dolus eventualis as a standard.63 In short, it is argued that the courts 
should limit the interpretation of the word ‘intention’ in this context to dolus 
directus. This is to prevent absurd results from ensuing such as the conviction of 
persons who had no direct intention to access or to intercept the protected data.  
 
                                                 
62 Burchell J Principles of Criminal Law (2004) 501 
63 The information does not need to be accessed or intercepted in a complicated way. The level of 
technology used to secure the data does not define the sensitivity of the information. It is sufficient that the 
data is classified as confidential and therefore off limits to unauthorized personnel. 
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It is also important to bear in mind that in South African law, the general rule is 
that an act does not make a man guilty unless his mind is also guilty.64 In 
construing statutory prohibitions or injunctions the legislature is presumed, in the 
absence of clear and convincing indications to the contrary, to have intended 
innocent violations thereof to be punishable.65 In other words, it is to be presumed 
that the legislature intended mens rea to be an element of liability of a statutory 
offence. The presence of fault words such as ‘maliciously’, ‘knowingly’ or 
‘corruptly’ are somewhat indicative of the legislatures intention to not punish 
innocent violations of the legislation. An argument could be made for the court 
not to punish innocent violations if the offense requires dolus directus. Although 
the ECT Act specifically requires intention there appears to be no indication of 
what kind of intention is required. The scope of the intention should cover those 
who go out of their way to cause the unlawful consequence.  
 
An accused individual would be guilty of the offense regardless of their motives. 
To require motive to qualify the intention is fairly restrictive. Motive is a person’s 
reason for conduct. It is something separate and distinct from intention. The 
general rule is that motive is not taken into account when determining criminal 
intent. The reason for disregarding motive when determining criminal liability is 
                                                 
64 Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea 
65 As per Botha JA in S v Arenstein 1964 (1) SA 361 (A) 365 This case has been cited in recent judgments: 
Amalgamated Beverage Industries Natal (Pty) Ltd v Durban City Council (1994 (3) SA 170 (A) SACR 
373); Scagell v Attorney-General, Western Cape 1997 (2) SA 368 (CC) (1996 (2) SACR 579); Epstein v 
Bell 1997 (1) SA 483 (D) 
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that individual motives are too complex and are sometimes too obscure to provide 
a reliable basis for determining liability for punishment.66
 
An accused is culpable of the offense of prohibited access or interception where 
he or she had intent.  This implies that the accused must have had the intent to 
obtain access to or to intercept the computer data. He or she must also have had 
knowledge of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct. Because the crime requires 
mens rea in the form of intention liability is now invariably dependent upon the 
accused having known that he was acting in contravention of the law. It is not 
necessary to prove that the accused knew the detailed requirements of the offence 
charged, the exact section or wording of the legislation or the penalty for the 
offence, but merely that he or she knew, or at least foresaw the possibility, that 
what he was doing was contrary to law in the broad sense.67 To put it another 
way, the accused must have had known or suspected that he or she had no 
authority to access or to intercept the data on the computer. The knowledge 
component of the intent should be interpreted sufficiently widely to include cases 




The unlawful element of the crime is defined by the absence of permission or 
authority to access or to intercept the data. The authority must come from the 
                                                 
66 Burchell (n 62) 463 
67 Burchell (n 62) 497, 498 See also S v Hlomza 1987 (1) SA 25 (A) 31, 32 
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owner or the person lawfully in charge of the data.68 A distinction should be 
drawn between the person with authority to use computer and the person with 
authority to use the data. In this regard it must be noted that it is not the 
permission of the person in charge of the computer that is required but rather the 
permission of the person in charge of the data.69  
 
The absence of authority is an objectively determinable element. It will be 
determined with reference to the facts of each particular case.70 Authority is 
usually derived from the authorization by or the permission of the principal. 
Authorization is a unilateral juristic act by which one person empowers another to 
act on his behalf.71 Authorization confers actual authority in general or specific 
terms, expressly or tacitly.72 The person authorized to use the data or software 
program must have authority to delegate the authority to someone else. The 
person who delegates this authority to someone else cannot exceed authority 
given to him or her. 
 
The issue of authorization may arise in an employer-employee context. Take for 
example an employee who secures company data or information that he or she has 
authority to access on a day to day basis in the course of or for the purposes of his 
employment. Assume that the employee intends to procure this data for his or her 
                                                 
68 Access or interception of data without the permission of an owner’s username and password is illegal 
69 South African Law Commission (n 6)54  
70 Cf. Dicks v South African Mutual Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd 1963 4 SA 501 (N) 504 et seq 
71 Maasdorp v The Mayor of Graaff-Reinet 1915 CPD 636 639 
72 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (1993) 178 See also Coetzer v Mosenthals Ltd 1963 4 
SA 22 (A) 
 32
own advantage or for the advantage of a third party. In these circumstances, is the 
access to the data without authorization? The court in Shurgard Storage Centers 
Inc v Safeguard Self Storage Inc73 was faced with this very situation. The 
employee acquired the employer’s company trade secrets for a rival company. 
The said employee was charged with intentionally accessing the plaintiff’s 
computer without authorization.74 The court found that the authorization of an 
employee ended when that employee began acting as an agent for another person 
other than the employer.75 The court concluded that the conduct of the employee 
was without authorization.76 The case has the effect of criminalizing conduct that 
is not work-related. For this reason, it is submitted that employers set out data-
usage policies or workplace policy documents that stipulate what is expected of 
employees in the realm of data and computer usage.  
 
On another note, an accused may refute the allegations of the unlawfulness of his 
or her access or interception by demonstrating any one of the following things 
stipulated in the RICA: Any person, other than a law enforcement officer, may 
intercept any communication if he or she is a party to the communication, unless 
such communication is intercepted by such person for purposes of committing an 
offence.77 Alternatively, interception may take place if one of the parties to the 
communication has given prior consent in writing to such interception, unless 
                                                 
73 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000) 
74 118 U.S.C.§1030 (a) (2) (c) 
75 Shurgard case (n 73) 1124 
76 Shurgard case (n 73) 1125 
77 Section 4 (1) Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act No. 70 of 2002 
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such communication is intercepted by such person for purposes of committing an 
offence.78   
 
On the issue of interception, a person in the course of carrying on a business may 
intercept any indirect communication. The communication should be the means 
by which a transaction is entered into in the course of the business. It could also 
be communication that otherwise relates to that business or which takes place in 
the course of the carrying on of that business in the course of its transmission over 
a telecommunication system.79 Indirect communication includes email, faxes and 
telephonic conversations. The systems controller must have expressly or 
impliedly consented to the interception of the indirect communication. The 
purpose of such interception must be to establish the existence of facts.80 It is not 
certain whether the interception of indirect communications by the systems 
controller will be unlawful if there is no prior written consent of the employee. In 
light of this vagueness, it is advisable that the systems controller obtains the 
written consent of its employees, if the case may be, before such interception 
takes place. It is also highly advisable for a juristic person to compile a clear, up-
to-date, well-publicised and active policy document that sets out the permitted 
and/or prohibited conduct in computer and internet usage. This should be done so 
as to avoid criminal liability as well as the possibility of being penalised. 
                                                 
78 Section 5 (1) Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act No. 70 of 2002 
79 Section 6 (1) Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act No. 70 of 2002  
80 Section 6 (2) Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act No. 70 of 2002 
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As an aside, some juristic persons make use of blocking and filtering software 
products or devices. These software products allow the censorship of incoming 
and outgoing email and or prevent access to certain websites. The question to 
answer is whether the operation of blocking and filtering software amounts to the 
interception of indirect communication.  
 
Blocking software examines and inspects the content of messages and websites to 
determine if it contains a set of pre-determined keywords or phrases such as 'sex' 
or ‘pornography’ for example. If an email and its attachments or a webpage 
contains one of these keywords or phrases, the message is blocked and/or deleted. 
In some cases a return message is addressed to the sender, informing him or her 
that the email was blocked. The examination and inspection of direct 
communication such as email or the monitoring of internet usage amounts to 
interception and therefore brings the conduct of the system controller into the 
prevue of the IMIP Act, the RICA and the ECT Act. Thus it may be argued that 
the use of blocking and filtering software products or devices will be unlawful 






Interference with Data 
 
The compilation of data takes time, effort and resources. Section 86 (2) of the Electronic 
Communications Act seeks to protect the data of persons so as to allow the enjoyment of 
that data without hindrance or obstruction. The main objective here is to give a general 
indication of how the ECT Act accomplishes this. References to Article 4 of the 
Cybercrime Convention will be made to assist in the interpretation of section 86 (2). 
 
3.1 General Overview of Section 86 (2)
 
Article 4 of the Cybercrime Convention and section 86 (2) of the ECT Act deal with the 
interference of data. Article 4 states the following: 
 
Article 4 of the Cybercrime Convention on Data Interference  
1. Each party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when 
committed intentionally, the damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration 
or suppression of computer data without right. 
2. A Party may reserve the right to require that the conduct described in 
paragraph 1 result in serious harm.81 
 
                                                 
81 Article 4 Cybercrime Convention  
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Article 4 of the Convention obliges Parties such as South Africa to criminalize the illegal 
interference of data. Section 86 (2) of the Electronic Communications Act does just that.  
 
Section 86 (2) ECT Act on the interference of data states the following: 
2) A person who intentionally and without authority to do so, interferes 
with data in a way which causes such data to be modified, destroyed 
or otherwise rendered ineffective, is guilty of an offence.  
 
As stated above, section 86 (2) of the ECT Act seeks to protect the data of persons so as 
to allow the enjoyment of that data without interference. The section makes it an offence 
to intentionally interfere with another person’s data without authority. Any deliberate and 
unauthorized interference which results in the modification, the destruction or the 
ineffectiveness of the data in anyway is specifically prohibited by the Act. 
 
3.2 Interpretation of Section 86 (2) 
 
The Cybercrime Convention’s reference to the “damaging” and “deterioration” relates to 
the negative alteration of the data. The Explanatory Report to the Convention informs us 
that “deletion” is the destruction and the suppressing of computer data means any action 
that prevents or terminates the availability of the data to the person who has access to the 
computer or to the data carrier on which it is stored. The term “alteration” means the 
modification of existing data. The input of malicious codes such as viruses and Trojan 
horses is covered under this paragraph. 
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Interpreting section 86 (2) of the Electronic Communications Act is a little more difficult. 
This is because the legislature did not provide direction on how to go about interpreting 
the section. The words ‘modification’, ‘destruction’ and the phrase ‘rendered ineffective’ 
form essential components of the offence. The lack of guidance in the legislation leaves 
us to turn to the courts for a way forward. However, seeing as section 86 (2) has yet to be 
adjudicated upon, general definitions of these terms will have to suffice.   
 
Generally speaking, the interference of data is the tampering, meddling or the frustration 
of a person’s use of that data. It is put forward that the ECT Act considers it an offence to 
meddle with the data of another person in a way which causes their data to be altered in 
form or character, to spoil the data or to cause it to become ineffectual. A person who, 
intentionally and without authority causes data to become ineffective is one who has 
caused that data not to produce the effect that the owner intended. The activities 
described above brings these conducts into the ambit of the section 86 (2) of the ECT 
Act. 
 
Under Article 4 of the Convention, a Party may reserve the right to require that the 
conduct described result in serious harm.82 The Electronic Communications Act does not 
contain a provision to this regard. It is arguable that the absence of such a provision 
widens the scope of the legislation to encompass both serious and not-so-serious 
offences. In order for South Africa to reserve the right to require that the offence result in 
                                                 
82 Article 4 Cybercrime Convention  
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serious harm, we would have to notify the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of 
this intended interpretation.83
 




An accused is culpable of the offence of unlawfully interfering with data where he 
or she had the intention to do so. It is a requirement that the accused know that his 
or her conduct is unlawful. This does not mean that the accused should have 
detailed knowledge of the law that he or she is breaking as it is sufficient that the 
accused knew, or at least foresaw the possibility that what he was doing was 
contrary to the law in the broad sense.84 To put it another way, the accused must 
have known or suspected that he or she had no authority to interfere with the data. 
The knowledge component of the intent should be interpreted sufficiently widely 
to include cases where the accused turns a blind eye to the unlawfulness of their 
conduct.85 An accused would be guilty of the offence regardless of their motives.  
  
As an aside, computer viruses are the bane of the data stored on computers. Every 
now and again, computer viruses are spread throughout various networks causing 
                                                 
83 Explanatory Report on Cybercrime Convention available at  
http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/eu/cybercrime-final-notes.htm
84 Burchell (n 62) 497, 498 See also S v Hlomza 1987 (1) SA 25 (A) 31-2 
85 South African Law Commission (n 6) 57 
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damage to computers and/or data stored on these machines. 86 The question that 
needs to be answered is whether writing and spreading a computer virus could 
constitute an offence in terms of the ECT Act. 
 
A computer virus may directly or indirectly infect a computer and/or its data and 
spread throughout a network. The virus tends to spread indiscriminately and could 
bring a network system to its knees within minutes. The parasitic nature of a 
computer virus is such that it either causes the computer to come to a standstill, 
causes programs to run irregularly and to damage or destroy files. All these 
consequences indicate the ways in which viruses cause data to be modified, 
destroyed or otherwise rendered ineffective.  
 
Viruses are created by people who know how to write computer programs. This 
demonstrates that the bug is neither accidental nor a computer glitch. The 
intentional writing of a computer virus satisfies the requirement of intention to 
commit the crime of unlawful interference of data. There are times when the 
writers of computer viruses have a specific target in mind. However, viruses have 
been known to spread easily regardless of the writer’s goal. With this in mind, an 
argument could be made for the courts to interpret the word ‘intention’ in section 
86 (2) of the ECT Act to mean dolus indirectus. This is because although the 
perpetrator had a specific target in mind he or she must have foreseen the 
possibility of interfering with the data stored on other computers.  
                                                 
86 Sophos reports that the following are the top ten viruses for 2004 are Netsky - P, Zafi – B, Sasser, Netsky 
– B, Netsky – D, Netsky – Z, MyDoom – A, Sober – I, Netsky – C, Bagle – AA. Available at 





The act of interfering with data in a way which causes the data to be modified, 
destroyed or otherwise rendered ineffective is unlawful only if such an act was 
without the authorization of the owner of the data. The keyword here is 
“authorization”. The absence of authority is an objectively determinable element. 
It will be determined with reference to the facts of each particular case.87 
Authorization implies that the act of interfering with data will not be a punishable 
offence if such interference was authorized by the person lawfully in charge of the 
data. A distinction should be drawn between the person with authority to use the 
data and the person lawfully in charge of the data.  
 
The case of Fugarino v State88 illustrates the importance of making the distinction 
between owner of data and person authorized to use it. In this case, Fugarino was 
a computer programmer and an employee of the owner of the data he worked on. 
Part of his job involved writing programs that the employer could use. It may be 
assumed that in the normal course of his employment he was permitted to destroy 
programs where appropriate. A dispute arose between Fugarino and his employer. 
Fugarino decided to destroy a program he had written for his employer. The court 
found that the deletion of the program was without authority because Fugarino did 
                                                 
87 Cf. Dicks v South African Mutual Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd 1963 4 SA 501 (N) 504 et seq 
88 531 S.E. 2d 187 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) 
 41
not have the permission to do so from the owner of the company. 89 The court 
looked at the way in which Fugarino had destroyed the data and found that the 
vindictive and retaliatory manner of the employee constituted conduct without 
authority.90  
 
It is important that the authority comes from the person lawfully in charge of the 
data for another reason. There may be situations where a person other than the 
owner of the data has authority over that data. For example, in a criminal law 
matter the investigating authority may charge that certain data in the possession of 
an individual or juristic person should not be interfered or tampered with. The 
tampering of data in this situation in a way which causes such data to be modified, 
destroyed or otherwise rendered ineffective may be a criminal offence and it may 
constitute an obstruction of justice.  In this situation, the authority shifts from the 
owner of the data to the investigating authorities who may be seen as the persons 
lawfully in charge of the data. 
 
                                                 
89 Furgarino case (n 89) 189 




Overcoming E-Security Measures 
 
It is unfortunate that there has been a proliferation of network security breaches over the 
past few years. A survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute found that of the 
643 corporations that they surveyed, over 70% reported network security breaches during 
the year 2000. In addition, the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) co-
ordination center at Carnegie-Mellon University reported a 183% increase in reported 
incidents between 1998 and 1999. CERT also reported an increase from 9 859 incidents 
in 1999 to 15 162 incidents in the first three quarters of the following year.91
 
The common sale, production and usage of these items are a cause for concern for anyone 
conducting any sort of business or transaction over the internet. Section 86 (3) and (4) of 
the Electronic Communications Act and Article 6 of the Cybercrime Convention target 
this very issue. This part of the research aims to discuss the measures under the 
Electronic Communications Act and the Cybercrime Convention.  
 
4.1 General Overview of Section 86 (3) and (4) 
 
Section 86 (3) and (4) of the Electronic Communications Act deals with the issue of 
protecting the integrity of security measures and passwords used to secure data. Section 
86 (3) and (4) states the following: 
                                                 
91 http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/intl/USComments_CyberCom_final.pdf  
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3)  A person who unlawfully produces, sells, offers to sell, procures for use, 
designs, adapts for use distributes or possesses any device, including a computer 
program or component, which is designed to primarily to overcome security 
measures for the protection of data, or performs any of those acts with regard to 
a password, or access code or any other similar kind of data with the intent to 
unlawfully utilize such item to contravene this section, is guilty of an offence. 
4) A person who utilizes any device or computer program mentioned in 
subsection (3) in order to unlawfully overcome security measures designed to 
protect such data or access thereto, guilty of an offence.  
 
Section 86 (3) and (4) of the ECT Act criminalizes of the development and trafficking in 
devices, components and programs which are primarily used to obtain unauthorized 
access to restricted data protected by passwords or access codes. Such devices, 
components and software are sometimes designed to protect copyrighted material such as 
CDs, DVDs and written material. Some owners of literary works are taking technological 
measures to protect their intellectual property. For instance automated rights management 
(ARM) allows copyright owners to control the use of their work. Automated rights 
management provides the owners of intangible assets with defensive mechanisms built 
into computer hardware and software and implemented via firewalls, encryption and 
passwords. ARM aims at permitting information providers, and perhaps even individual 
owners of proprietary data, to sell access on a document-by-document basis. The simplest 
such pay-per-use systems offer encrypted documents for sale, or rather the keys to those 
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documents, one at a time. The purchaser of a key gets access to a single locked 
document.92   
 
Similarly digital rights management (DRM) is a used to control or to restrict the use of 
digital media content on electronic devices with such technologies installed. Music, 
visual artwork, computer and video games and movies are often protected by DRM.93 
The discussion on section 86 (3) and (4) below will illustrate how our law shields 
protective measures such as ARM, DRM, other devices, components, software, 
passwords and codes. References to a United States statute, the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) will be made will be made as it touches on issues 
pertinent to this line of discussion. 
 
Article 6 of the Cybercrime Convention contains a detailed provision on the misuse of 
devices. It states the following: 
 
Article 6 - Misuse of devices 
1. Each party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may  be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when 
committed intentionally and without right: 
a. The production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or 
otherwise making available of: 
                                                 
92 http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/FullFared.html  
93 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Rights_Management  
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i. A device, including a computer program, designed or adapted 
primarily for the purpose of committing any of the offences 
established in accordance with Article 2- 5; 
ii. A computer password, access code or similar data by which 
the whole or any part of a computer system is capable of being 
assessed is 
With intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the 
offences established in Articles 2 – 5;  
And 
b. The possession of an item referred to in paragraphs (a)(1) or (2) 
above, with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of 
the offences established in Articles 2 – 5. A party may require by law 
that a number of such items be possessed before criminal liability 
attaches.  
 
2. This article shall not be interpreted as imposing criminal liability where the 
production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise 
making available or possession referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is 
not for the purpose of committing an offence established in accordance with 
Articles 2 through 5 of this Convention, such as for the authorized testing or 
protection of a computer system. 
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3. Each Party may reserve the right not to apply paragraph 1 of this Article, 
provided that the reservation does not concern the sale, distribution or 
otherwise making available of the items referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (2). 
 
4.2 Interpretation of Section 86 (3) (4) 
 
Unfortunately, the ECT Act does not provide direction where the issue of the definition 
of terms is concerned. For this reason it is recommended that we look towards the 
Cybercrime Convention to glean some ideas on how certain terms may be interpreted. 
The word “distribution” in the Cybercrime Convention refers to the active act of 
forwarding data to others, while “making available” refers to the placing online devices 
for the use of others.94 The inclusion of a “computer program” in the Convention refers 
to programs that are, for instance, designed to alter or even to destroy data or to interfere 
with the operation of systems, such as virus programs, or programs designed or adapted 
to gain access to computer systems.95  
 
The offence described in the Cybercrime Convention requires that it be committed 
intentionally and without right. In order to avoid the danger of over-criminalization 
where devices are produced and put on the market for legitimate purposes, further 
elements are added to restrict the offence. Apart from the general intent requirement, 
there must be the specific or direct intent that the device is used for the purpose of 
                                                 
94 This term also intends to cover the creation or compilation of hyperlinks in order to facilitate access to 
such devices. 
95 Explanatory Report on Cybercrime Convention  available at 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/eu/cybercrime-final-notes.htm
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committing any of the offences established in Articles 2 through to Article 5 of the 
Convention.96
 
It is not certain when producing, adapting, selling, distributing and the procurement of 
goods which are primarily designed to overcome security measures would be lawful. It is 
arguable that the word “unlawfully” as it is used in section 86 (3) of the ECT Act 
qualifies these activities. It is proposed that section 86 (3) and (4) of the ECT Act could 
be interpreted in a manner similar to the interpretation of Article 6 of the Cybercrime 
Convention. Under the Cybercrime Convention, it is assumed that test devices (“cracking 
devices”) and network analysis devices that are produced for legitimate purposes and that 
are designed by industry to control the reliability of their information technology 
products or to test system security, and would be considered to be lawful.97 In light of 
this, it is suggested that the law enforcement authorities and research institutions that 
produce, use and distribute these devices should be exempt from liability under section 
86 (3) of the ECT Act. It is debatable that it could not have been the intention of the 
legislature to prosecute these individuals. Until the courts have adjudicated on this point, 
the question as to whether crime enforcement authorities and researchers will be liable 
remains unanswered. 
 
The Electronic Communications Act does not provide guidance on the meaning of the 
phrase ‘designed to primarily to overcome security measures’. On a plain reading of the 
                                                 
96 Explanatory Report on Cybercrime Convention available at  
http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/eu/cybercrime-final-notes.htm
97 Explanatory Report on Cybercrime Convention  available at 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/eu/cybercrime-final-notes.htm
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section, the phrase could mean that the device, computer program or component’s main 
object should be to override the security measures put in place by the owner of the data. 
If the device, program or component forms a part of another device then one should ask 
what the primary or main function of the device or program is. This means that although 
the device, software program or component may perform (other) legitimate functions, it 
would still be an offence to sell, offer to sell, procure, design or to use that portion of the 
device, software program or component which is solely for the purpose of circumventing 
security measures employed to protect data.  
 
Section 86 (3) and (4) of the ECT Act  and Article 6 of the Cybercrime Convention are 
restricted to devices designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing an 
offence. Nevertheless, this excludes dual-use devices. It could be argued that if the device 
or software program has only limited commercially significant purposes other than the 
circumvention of security measures then the product manufacturer, distributor and user 
may be found guilty of an offence as per section 86 (3) and (4) of the ECT Act.  
 
Provisions similar to section 86 (3) of the ECT Act can be found in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). The DMCA targets the circumvention of 
digital walls guarding copyrighted material and trafficking in circumvention tools. A 
simple reading of section 1201 of the DMCA makes it clear that its prohibition applies to 
the manufacturing, trafficking in and the making of devices that would circumvent 
encryption technology. It is the technology itself at issue.  
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The Electronic Communications Act does not define the phrase ‘security measure’. It is 
put forward that the phrase ‘security measure’ in the sense used by section 86 (3) of the 
ECT Act is similar to the term ‘technological measure’ referred by in the DCMA. The 
DMCA defines the expression to ‘circumvent a technological measure’ as to ‘descramble 
a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, 
deactivate or impair technological measure, without the authority of the copyright 
owner’.98 The DMCA also defines ‘to circumvent protection afforded by a technological 
measure’ as ‘avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing a 
technological measure.’99 A brief look at the DMCA demonstrates how the interpretation 
of a statute is made easier when crucial terms are defined.   In the absence of sufficient 
clarity from the legislature, it is suggested that our courts should possibly consider 
looking to the DMCA as well as the Cybercrime Convention for possible guidance. 
 
There is still a question that needs to be answered in the context of devices and software 
used to overcome passwords and codes. The question is could an accused be successfully 
convicted under section 86 (3) and (4) of the ECT Act if that person did not introduce the 
device or program that overcame a password or code-based restriction him or herself? In 
other words, could a conviction ensue if the data owner’s computer system already 
contains flaws or devices, components or software that enabled the restricted data to be 
accessed? This question has not been answered by our courts as yet. It could be argued 
that a conviction should follow where a person exploits the weaknesses in a system to 
                                                 
98 Section 1201 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (3) (A) 
99 Section 1201 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (2) (A) 
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obtain access without authorization. The court in United States v Morris100 coined the 
intended function test. In short, devices, components and software should not be used in a 
way that the owner of such material did not intend them to be used.101 In light of this 
judgment, it is suggested that the South African courts should perhaps convict a person 
who obtains access to protected data using the devices, software or exploiting weaknesses 
in the computer of another in a way that was not intended by the owner.  
 
As an alternative, an accused could be found guilty under the hacking and interception 
provision located in section 86 (1) of the ECT Act.  This section simply prohibits access 
of data without the authority or the permission to do so. 
 
There is yet another issue that the courts may have to address in the future. That is, could 
an accused be convicted of ‘accessing’ data restricted by a password or a code if that 
person was not successful in obtaining the data? This question came up in the American 
case of State v Allen.102 In this case, Allen would manipulate the Southwestern Bell 
Telephone computer to his advantage to dial up free long-distance phone calls. It is 
assumed that when the computer prompted Allen for a username and password, he would 
guess them correctly. The State had argued for the definition of “access” to mean to 
approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in retrieve form, or otherwise make use 
of any resources of a computer.103 The court stated that if to access a computer really 
meant ‘to approach’ then any unauthorized physical proximity to a computer could 
                                                 
100 928 F.2d 504 (2d. Cir. 1991) 
101 Morris case (n 101) 510 
102 917 P. 2d 848 (Kan. 996) 
103 Allen case (n 103) 851 quoting Kansas Statutes Annotated § 21 – 3755 (a) (1) 
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constitute a crime. Furthermore, the court turned to and preferred the Webster’s 
dictionary meaning “access”. Webster’s defines “access” as “freedom or ability to obtain 
or make use of.” The Kansas court used this definition to shed light on Allen’s conduct. 
The court came to the following conclusion: 
 
Until Allen proceeded beyond the initial banner and entered appropriate 
passwords he could not be said to have had the ability to make use of 
Southwestern Bell’s computers or obtain anything. Therefore, he cannot be said 
to have gained access to Southwestern Bell’s computer systems as gaining access 
is commonly understood.104
 
In short, the court held that being prompted to enter a username and password did not 
amount to access. However, overcoming the username and password restriction by 
unlawful means is access and it is a punishable offence. It is argued that our courts should 
possibly adopt a similar approach and bear in mind that to punish someone for coming 
across the username and password prompt is excessive. Adopting a broad definition of 
“access” in this context could lead to the absurd result of courts punishing someone for 






                                                 
104 Allen case (n 103) 853 
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The ECT Act refers to the intentional utilization of a device, computer program or 
component that is designed primarily to overcome security measures, passwords 
or codes. The use of the word ‘intention’ in a statute indicates the requirement of 
dolus.105 In South African law, the general rule is that the conduct of the accused 
does not make him or her guilty unless his mind is also guilty.106 An argument 
could be made for the scope of the intention to cover those people whose 
objective is to cause the unlawful consequence. With this in mind, dolus directus 
should perhaps be the standard of intention used by the courts when interpreting 
section 86 (3). Dolus directus is present where the accused’s aim and object was 
to carry out the unlawful act or to cause the consequence even though the chance 
of its resulting was small.107  
 
Criminal law does not take into account the motives of the accused. Therefore, it 
seems that a perpetrator would be guilty of the offence regardless of their motives. 
This is mainly because individual motives are too complex and they are 
sometimes too obscure to provide a reliable basis for determining liability for 
                                                 
105 In S v Nxumalo 1993 (3) SA 456 (O) (1993 (1) SACR 743) the Court concluded that mens rea in the 
form of intention was required for a contravention of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, since the statute 
resembled the common-law crimes of theft and fraud which could not be perpetrated negligently. 
106 Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea 
107 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 301 
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punishment.108 Furthermore, to require motive to qualify the intention would 
restrict the interpretation of the statute.  
 
As stated above, there is a measure of uncertainty that remains regarding the 
application of section 86 (3) of the ECT Act. It seems that the section fails to take 
into account the need for computer security professionals and researchers to 
design or use products with the capacity for system penetration. These devices, 
computer programs or components could be used to conduct security assessments 
as the need arises. According to this law, even computer forensic tools that have 
been designed to primarily overcome security measures for the protection of data 
or to perform any of those acts with regard to passwords or codes are unlawful.  
 
In the aforementioned case of United States v Morris109 the accused was charged 
with intentionally accessing a Federal interest computer without authorization.110 
Morris had written a program that was designed to uncover flaws in the internet 
security system. The program was designed primarily to guess passwords. 
However, the program caused severe damage to part of the internet which resulted 
in part of the internet being shut down. In his defense, Morris argued that he was 
not entirely “without authorization” to access the computers he had used because 
he had authorized access to some of those computers. The court responded as 
follows to this line of defense: 
 
                                                 
108 Burchell (n 62) 463 
109 928 F.2d 504 (2d. Cir. 1991) 
110 18 U.S.C § 1030 (a) (5) (A) 
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Congress was not drawing a bright line between those who have some 
access to any federal interest computer and those who have none. 
Congress contemplated that individuals with access to some federal 
interest computers would be subject to liability under the computer fraud 
provisions for gaining unauthorized access to other federal interest 
computers.111
 
The court’s response shows that even people with authorized access overstep the 
mark when they access restricted data by means of a device or a program. This 
same line of reasoning or thinking could be applied to the ECT Act. This case 
more or less foretells the possible outcome of security professionals and 
researchers who use devices and programs to overcome restrictions on protected 
data unless and until exceptions or exemptions are made through amendments to 
the ECT Act. To neglect to do so could hinder law enforcement agencies and 
researchers from performing their functions.  
 
As an aside, viruses may sometimes be used as software designed to overcome 
protective measures on data. It is arguable that like other forms of unpopular 
expression such as pornography and propaganda, the free speech provisions of the 
South African Constitution112 protect even a malicious computer code. However, 
if the virus was programmed with the main purpose to overcome security 
                                                 
111 Morris case (n 110) 511 
112 Section 16 of the South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996 
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measures then such programming will be illegal in terms of section 86 (3) of the 
ECT Act.  
 
An accused is culpable of the offence described in section 86 (3) where he or she 
had the direct intention to commit the crime. The intention must be to produce, 
sell, offer to sell, procure for use, design, and adapt for use, distribution or 
possession any device, program or component that is designed primarily to 
overcome security precautions or passwords and codes that protect data. This 
means that the accused’s goal must have been to commit this offence. He or she 
must also have had knowledge of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct. Because 
the crime requires mens rea in the form of intention liability is now invariably 
dependent upon the accused having known that he was acting in contravention of 
the law. It is not necessary to prove that the perpetrator knew the detailed 
requirements of the offence that he is charged with, the exact section or wording 
of the legislation or the penalty for the offence, but merely that he or she knew, or 
at least foresaw the possibility, that what he was doing was contrary to law in the 
broad sense.113 To put it another way, the accused must have known or at least 
suspected that he or she had no authority to bypass any security measure that was 
installed to protect the data. The knowledge component of the intent should be 
interpreted widely enough to include cases where the accused turns a blind eye to 
the unlawfulness of their conduct.  
 
 
                                                 




The unlawful element of the crime described in section 86 (3) and (4) is defined 
by the absence of authority by the owner of the protected data. Only the person 
lawfully in charge of the data can consent to the bypassing of security measures 
that he or she may have put in place.  
 
The issue of authorization to overcome security measures used to protect data was 
raised in the case of 321 Studios v MGM Inc. In this case, 321 Studios asserted 
that its software did not violate section 1201 of the DMCA because the software 
did not ‘circumvent’ encryption. 321 Studios stated that its software did not avoid, 
bypass, remove, deactivate or otherwise impair a technological measure, but that 
it simply used the authorized key to unlock the encryption. However the court 
held that while 321’s software did use the authorized key to access the DVD, it 
did not have the authority to use this key as licensed DVD players do, and it 
therefore avoided and bypassed security measures.114  
 
The absence of authority is an objectively determinable element. It will be 
determined with reference to the facts of each particular case.115
 
                                                 
114 321 Studios v Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios Inc 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 




Denial of Service Attacks 
 
Denials of service attacks are undesirable to say the least. These attacks interfere with the 
running of businesses, government computers and even personal computers. The 
Electronic Communications Act attempts to discourage computer users from causing 
denials of service. Article 5 of the Cybercrime Convention is relevant to this discussion. 
It will be discussed in conjunction with section 86 (5) of the ECT Act. 
 
5.1 General Overview of Section 86 (5) 
 
Section 86 (5) of the ECT Act garners its inspiration from Article 5 of the Cybercrime 
Convention. To be able to appreciate the interpretation of section 86 (5) it is suggested 
that Article 5 be examined. Article 5 states the following on the topic of system 
interference: 
 
Article 5 – System Interference 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary 
to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed 
intentionally, the serious hindering without right of the functioning of a computer 
system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering, or 
suppressing computer data. 
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Section 86 (5) of the Electronic Communications Act targets the issue of denial of service 
attacks. It states the following: 
 
5) A person who commits any act described in this section with the intent to 
interfere with access to an information system so as to constitute a denial, of 
service to legitimate users is guilty of an offence.  
 
The essential components of this offence are the intention and access to an information 
system with the intention to cause a denial of service to legitimate users. An information 
system is a system for generating, sending receiving, storing, or otherwise processing 
data messages and includes the internet.116  
 
5.2 Interpretation of Section 86 (5) 
 
The “hindering” mentioned to in Article 5 of the Cybercrime Convention must be serious 
in order to attract criminal liability. Each Party to the Convention had to determine for 
itself what criteria must be fulfilled in order for the hindering to be considered “serious”. 
For example, a Party may require a certain amount of damage to be caused in order for 
the hindering to be considered “serious”. It seems that the drafters considered denial of 
service attacks as “serious”.117 It is the denial of service attacks that section 86 (5) of the 
ECT Act concentrates on. 
 
                                                 
116 Section 1 Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
117 Explanatory Report on Cybercrime Convention available at  
http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/eu/cybercrime-final-notes.htm
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Section 86 (5) of the ECT Act serves to criminalize denial of service attacks. However, 
the ECT Act does not provide direction on how this “attack” should be defined. A denial 
of service is commonly defined as an incident which deprives legitimate users or an 
organization of the services they would normally expect to have such as the use of email. 
Such an attack may even result in a website ceasing to operate temporarily. The 
perpetrator intentionally gains unlawful access to into a number of internet-connected 
computers and installs a Trojan which allows the attacker to remotely control the 
compromised computers. 118 He or she may purposely overload a mail server or web 
server with phony requests. The result is that the network is rendered unable to 
distinguish between legitimate traffic and malicious or false traffic during the attack and 
causes the mail or web server to crash.  
 
A denial of service attack usually results in the loss of time and money for the target 
person or organization. 
 
Lastly, the hindering of a computer system under the Cybercrime Convention must be 
“without right”. Common activities inherent in the design of networks, or common 
operational or commercial practices are considered to be with right. These include the 
testing of the security of a computer system, or its protection, authorized by its owner or 
operator, or the reconfiguration of a computer’s operating system that takes place when 
the operator of a system installs new software that disables similar or previously installed 
programs. Such conduct is not criminalized by Article 5 even if it causes serious 
                                                 
118 Anslie J ‘Distributed Denial of Service: Internet as a War zone’ available at 
http://www.networktimes.co.za/article.asp?pklArticleID=3202&pklIssueID=439&pklCategoryID=211   
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hindering.119 Unfortunately, the Electronic Communications Act does not seem to allow 
for such an interpretation. There appears to be no distinction made between a person who 
interferes with a computer system for the purpose of research or testing for example and a 
person who the malicious intention of causing a denial of service regardless of the 
interference caused to legitimate users. 
 




Section 86 (5) of the ECT Act refers to the intention to interfere with access to an 
information system so as to constitute a denial of service to legitimate users. The 
use of the word ‘intention’ in a statute indicates the requirement of dolus.120 It is 
argued that the courts should interpret ‘intention’ in this case to constitute dolus 
directus.  Dolus directus is present where the accused’s aim and object was to 
carry out the unlawful act or to cause the consequence even though the chance of 
its resulting was small.121 It could be argued that any other type of intention could 
lead to absurd results that could not have been the intention of the legislature. 
Take for example an innocent person sends email with attachments to a target 
person or organization. However, because of the size of the attachments the target 
                                                 
119 Explanatory Report on Cybercrime Convention available at 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/eu/cybercrime-final-notes.htm
120 In S v Nxumalo 1993 (3) SA 456 (O) (1993 (1) SACR 743) the Court concluded that mens rea in the 
form of intention was required for a contravention of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, since the statute 
resembled the common-law crimes of theft and fraud which could not be perpetrated negligently. 
121 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 301 
 61
person’s email ceases to operate properly albeit temporarily. The conduct of the 
person who sent the email constitutes a denial of service attack. This is because 
although usually intentional and malicious, denial of service attack can sometimes 
happen accidentally. Interpreting ‘intent’ to mean dolus directus will help ensure 
that innocent people are not convicted of a crime that they had no direct intention 
to commit.  
 
An accused would be guilty of the offence regardless of their motives. To require 
motive to qualify the intention is fairly restrictive. Motive is a person’s reason for 
conduct. It is something separate and distinct from intention. The general rule is 
that motive is not taken into account when determining criminal intent. 
 
An accused is culpable where he or she commits a denial of service attack where 
he or she had the intention to do so.  This means that the accused must have had 
the intent to interfere with access to an information system in such a way as to 
disrupt services that legitimate users would normally expect to have. 
 
The accused must also have had knowledge of the unlawfulness of his or her 
conduct. Because the crime requires mens rea in the form of intention, liability is 
now invariably dependent upon the accused having known that he was acting in 
contravention of the law. It is sufficient that he or she knew, or at least foresaw 
the possibility, that what he was doing was contrary to law in the broad sense.122 
In other words, the accused must have had known or suspected that he or she 
                                                 
122 Burchell (n 62) 497, 498 See also S v Hlomza 1987 (1) SA 25 (A) 31, 32 
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could cause the denial of service. The knowledge component of the intent should 
be interpreted sufficiently widely to include cases where the accused willfully 




The unlawful element of the crime is defined by the absence of permission or 
authority to interfere with access to an information system so as to constitute a 
denial of service to legitimate users.123 The authority must come from the owner 
or the person lawfully in charge of the information system. The absence of 
authority is an objectively determinable element. It will be determined with 
reference to the facts of each particular case.124
                                                 
123 The authorization may be given so as to test a mail or web sever for example. 




Crimes That Are Not Found in the Electronic Communications Act 
 
The Electronic Communications Act criminalizes some but not all the crimes that can be 
perpetrated by use of a computer. The crimes of phishing, advance fee fraud, identity 
theft and cyber stalking are a few of these omitted crimes. The successful prosecution of 
the persons responsible for these actions will depend upon the official recognition of 
these conducts as crimes by our law. The object of this portion of the paper is to 
investigate the possibility of successfully prosecuting the offenders under the common 
law. Evaluations and recommendations will be put forward in an attempt to shed light on 
the matters that the legislature should perhaps deal with in the event that the Electronic 
Communications Act is amended.   
 
6.1 Phishing and Advance Fee Fraud 
 
The activities of phishing and advance fee fraud are not part of the crimes named in the 
Electronic Communications Act. These offences are discussed below. 
 
6.1.1 Definitions of the Offences 
 
Phishing, also known as carding or spoofing, is characterized by attempts to 
fraudulently acquire sensitive information such as passwords and credit card 
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details. The perpetrator masquerades as a trustworthy person or business in an 
apparently official electronic communication such as an email or an instant 
message.125  
 
Phishing is a form of social engineering. In the field of computer security, social 
engineering is the practice of obtaining confidential information by manipulation 
of legitimate users. A social engineer commonly uses the telephone or the internet 
to dupe a person into revealing sensitive information or getting them to do 
something that is against typical policies. By this method the social engineers 
exploit the natural tendency of a person to trust another person’s word. Phishing 
does not work by exploiting computer security flaws. Instead, people are 
perceived as the “weak link” or flaw in computer security and it is this that makes 
social engineering possible. An example of a social engineering attack is conning 
a person into believing that the con artist is an administrator and that as an 
administrator, he or she requests the user’s password for various purposes. Users 
receive messages requesting their passwords and credit card information in order 
to set up their account, to reactivate settings or some other excuse in what are 
called phishing attacks.126 A gullible victim often provides the passwords and 
other sensitive information to the perpetrator. This grants the individual access to 
the victim’s funds and other property. 
 
                                                 
125 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Legislative_and_judicial_responses  
126 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_engineering_%28computer_security%29  
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Criminal activity that is akin to phishing is advance fee fraud. Advance fee fraud 
is similar to phishing in the sense that they both rely on the victim being a weak 
link to computer security. Advance fee fraud is more commonly known as 
Nigerian money transfer fraud, the Nigerian scam or 419 scams. The modus 
operandi of a 419 scammer is to pose as the agent of person seeking financial 
assistance. A typical request reads as follows: “A rich person from the needy 
country needs to discreetly move money abroad, would it be possible to use your 
account?” They promise the ‘investor’ a large portion of the money. A variant of 
the scam involves a barrister representing the estate of a deceased relative of the 
victim and claims to have gone to great lengths to find the victim in order to give 
them their share of the money.127  
 
6.1.2 Elements of the Offences 
 
6.1.2 (a) Intention/Culpability  
 
Criminal law recognizes, among others, dolus directus, dolus indirectus 
and dolus eventualis as the various types of intention an accused could 
have when committing a crime. The type of intention required for the 
crimes of phishing and advance fee fraud is dolus directus.  Dolus directus 
is present where the accused’s aim and object was to carry out the 
unlawful act or to cause the consequence even though the chance of its 
                                                 
127 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_engineering_%28computer_security%29
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resulting was small.128 The perpetrator need not know the victim 
personally for a conviction to be secured. The con artists tend to have the 
direct intention to defraud people regardless of who they are.  
 
An accused is culpable of the offense of phishing and advance fee fraud 
where he or she had the intention to commit the crimes. The knowledge of 
the unlawfulness of his or her conduct is a further requirement. Assuming 
that we had legislation to deal with these crimes, liability for would hinge 
upon the accused having known that he or she was acting in contravention 
of the law. The accused need not have known the detailed requirements of 
the offence charged, the exact section or wording of the legislation or the 
penalty for the offence, but merely that he or she knew, or at least foresaw 
the possibility, that what he was doing was contrary to law in the broad 
sense.129 In other words, the accused must have known or at least 
suspected that he or she was acting in contravention of the law. 
 
6.1.2 (b) Unlawfulness  
 
The unlawful element of the crime is defined by the absence of informed 
consent of the victim to access his or her property. The absence if 
informed consent or true consent implies or means that there is a lack of 
permission or authority to access the victim’s property. 
                                                 
128 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 301 
129 Burchell (n 62) 497, 498 See also S v Hlomza 1987 (1) SA 25 (A) 31, 32 
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6.1.3 Common law 
 
The crimes of phishing and advance fee fraud are not dealt with in any South 
African legislation let alone the ECT Act. The question that needs to be answered 
in light of this dearth, is could a conviction ensue against a person caught 
committing these activities? Two offences in the common law will be briefly 
discussed to in hopes of identifying a means of securing a conviction. These 
crimes are housebreaking and theft under false pretences. In addition to this, a 
statutory initiative taken elsewhere will be looked at to determine whether it could 
provide some guidance for our legislature. 
 
6.1.3 (a) Housebreaking 
Definition 
Housebreaking is the crime of unlawfully breaking and entering premises 
with intent to commit a crime on that premises.130  
 
Essential elements of the crime 





                                                 
130 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 601 
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(1) Unlawfulness 
The entry of the premises must be unlawful.131 This means that the person 
entering the premises must not have a right to do so under some title or 
contract or because he or she was expressly or impliedly invited.  
 
(2) Breaking 
For the crime to be committed there must be a breaking into the premises 
not merely an entering of the premises.132 Breaking involves the removal 
of some obstruction which forms part of the premises. The breaking must 
involve some displacement of some part of the building. However, 
breaking may take place without physical damage of any kind.133   
 
(3) Entering 
To commit the crime the intruder must break into the premises and he 
must also enter them.134
 
(4) Premises 
The general principle is that premises must be ‘such as are, or might 
ordinarily be, used for human habitation or for the storage or housing of 
                                                 
131 R v Steyn 1946 OPD 426; R v Faison 1952 (2) SA 671 (SR); R v Coetzee 1958 (2) SA 8 (T) 
132 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 603, S v Rudman 1989 (3) SA 368 (E) 385 
133 R v Faison 1952 (2) SA 671 (SR) at 673; R v Willy Ovamboland 1931 SWA 11 in Burchell and Milton 
(n 58) 60 
134 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 604 
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property of some kind’.135 The structure must be a physical one. However, 
it does not have to be immovable. 
 
It has been held that the following are premises: a store-room, a garage, a 
shop, a permanently secured tent, an office, an immovable display cabinet 
separate from but forming an integral portion of a shop, a cabin on board a 




Intruder must have had the intention to commit a crime on the premises. It 
is not sufficient that the intruder intended an unlawful breaking and 
entering.137
 
6.1.3 (a) (i) Evaluation and Recommendations 
 
It is strongly argued that the common law crime of housebreaking cannot apply to 
phishing scams and advance fee fraud. This is because to perpetrate the crime of 
housebreaking, the accused must break into the premises of another. The premises 
must be a physical structure. In order for the crime of housebreaking to apply in 
this instance the definition of ‘premises’ would need to be extended to include 
‘cyberspace’. It is argued that because the courts have limited authority to change 
                                                 
135 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 604 
136 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 604 
137 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 605 
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or alter precedent set by previous courts, the recognition of ‘cyberspace’ as a 
‘premises’ is unlikely to happen soon.  
 
6.1.3 (b) Theft by false pretences 
 
The crime of theft by false pretences is committed by any person who 
unlawfully and intentionally the steals the property of another. It is carried 
out by means of misrepresentation of some sort by the perpetrator.138
 
The crime is a cross between theft and fraud. In other words, it has 
characteristics of both theft and fraud. In theft there must be a taking of 
another’s property. In fraud, there must be a false representation that 
causes loss to the victim.139 Our law retains this curious hybrid although 
the crimes of theft and fraud adequately protect the gullible persons who 
succumb to the deceit of the tricksters.140
 
Essential elements 
The essential elements are (1) Unlawfulness (2) Taking (contrectatio) (3) 




                                                 
138 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 553 
139 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 553 
140 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 553 
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  (1) Unlawfulness  
The taking of the thing must be against the will of its owner. There may be 
some ground of justification for the taking of another’s property for 
example necessity, statutory authority or consent.141
 
  (2) Taking (contrectatio)
  Theft is committed by the taking of the property of another person.142
 
  (3) Property
Money is capable of being stolen even where it is not corporeal cash but is 
represented by a credit entry in books of account.143
 
 (4) Intention  
The fault of theft is intention. This means that the accused must intend to 
take the property knowing that it belongs to another and that the taking is 
unlawful.144 Motive of the doer is irrelevant. The accused must have 





                                                 
141 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 543 
142 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 543 
143 Per Holmes JA in S v Graham 1975 (3) SA (A) 576 
144 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 549 
145 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 550 quoting R v Sibiya 1955 (4) SA 247 (A) 
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  (5) Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation is an incorrect statement of fact or law made by one 
person to another. The misrepresentation may made by words or 
conduct.146
 
  6.1.3 (b) (i) Evaluation and Recommendations  
 
On the face of it, it seems that charging a scammer with theft by false pretences is a 
surer way of securing a conviction than the charge of breaking and entering. This is 
because phishing and advance fee fraud both involve the theft of property and the 
misrepresentation of fact. The misrepresentation typically takes place over the World 
Wide Web or by means of an electronic message. 
 
California has recently introduced the Anti-Phishing Act of 2005. This Act amends the 
Federal criminal code and criminalizes internet scams involving fraudulently obtaining 
personal information (phishing). Snippets of the Anti-Phishing Act of 2005 are as 
follows: 
 
22948.2 It shall be unlawful for any person, by means of a Web page, 
electronic mail message, or otherwise through use of the Internet, to 
solicit, request, or take any action to induce another person to provide 
identifying information by representing itself to be a business without the 
authority or approval of the business. 
                                                 
146 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 581 
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22948.3 (a) The following persons may bring an action against a person 
who violates or who is in violation of Section 22948.2: 
(1) A person who (A) is engaged in the business of providing Internet 
access service to the public, owns a Web page, or owns a trademark, 
and (B) is adversely affected by a violation of Section 22948.2 
       … 
(2) An individual who is adversely affected by a violation of Section 
22948.2 may bring an action, but only against a person who has 
directly violated Section 22948.2. 
       … 
(b) The Attorney General or a district attorney may bring an action 
against a person who violates or who is in violation of Section 22948.2 
    … 
 
In brief, the Anti-Phishing Act imposes a fine or imprisonment for up five years, or both, 
on a person who knowingly and with the intention to engage in an activity constituting 
fraud or identity theft. The accused creates or procures the creation of a website or 
domain name that represents itself as a legitimate online business without the authority or 
approval of the registered owner of such business. The accused employs the website or 
domain name to solicit means of identification from any person. 
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The Act imposes a fine or imprisonment for up five years, or both, for a person who 
knowingly and with the intent to engage in an activity constituting fraud or identity theft 
under Federal or State law. The person must have sent an electronic mail message that 
falsely represents itself as being sent by a legitimate online business. The person engaged 
in the illicit activity may have used an internet location tool referring or linking internet 
users to an online location on the World Wide Web that falsely purporting to belong to or 
be associated with legitimate business and solicits means of identification from the 
recipient.147
 
On the face of it, it seems as if section 22948.2 of the Anti-Phishing Act applies in 
instances where a business was or is being used as a ruse by the person behind the crime. 
However, certain questions arise with regards to its application. For instance, what is the 
definition of a ‘business’ in this context? Does it have to be an existing or legitimate 
business that is used as a front? Could a person who purports to act as an agent of another 
person, with no mention of a ‘business’ in the Web page or the electronic message, be 




The various conducts which make up phishing and advance fee fraud appear to 
satisfy the essential elements of theft by false pretences. Be that as it may, it is 
preferable that the Legislature initiates the criminalization of phishing and 
                                                 
147 Summary of the Anti-Phishing Act of 2005 available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d109:S.472:@@@L&summ2=m&#major%20actions  
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advance fee fraud. It is suggested that such an initiative will assist law 
enforcement agencies to secure convictions easily as opposed to attempting to 
apply the common law to the situation.  The legislation, it is hoped, will make 
the prosecution of the accused less complicated. It is also suggested that the 
Legislature provide comprehensive definitions and phrase the legislation in such 
a way that allows the courts to interpret freely. This will assist law enforcement 
agencies in a world where more and more people are becoming computer savvy 
and new computer crimes are being created and committed.  
      
A proposal could be made for the inclusion of fault words in any amendment 
the legislature may make. This is because in construing statutory prohibitions or 
injunctions the legislature is presumed, in the absence of clear and convincing 
indications to the contrary, to have intended innocent violations thereof to be 
punishable.148 The presence of fault words such as ‘maliciously’, ‘knowingly’ 
or ‘corruptly’ is somewhat indicative of the legislatures intention to not punish 
innocent violations of the legislation.  
 
6.2 Identity Theft  
 
 6.2.1 Definition of the Offence 
 
                                                 
148 As per Botha JA in S v Arenstein 1964 (1) SA 361 (A) 365 This case has been cited in recent 
judgments: Amalgamated Beverage Industries Natal (Pty) Ltd v Durban City Council (1994 (3) SA 170 (A) 
SACR 373); Scagell v Attorney-General, Western Cape 1997 (2) SA 368 (CC) (1996 (2) SACR 579); 
Epstein v Bell 1997 (1) SA 483 (D) 
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Identity theft or identity fraud is the deliberate assumption of another person’s identity. 
It is usually for economic gain or to frame the person for a crime.  
 
Some people distinguish the terms “identity theft” and “identity fraud”. It is said that 
identity is not something that can be stolen because victims do not cease being who 
they are. The argument is that the term “identity theft” should apply to unauthorized 
access to personal records and the latter to unauthorized (fraudulent) use of such 
records.149  
 
Techniques for obtaining identification range from stealing mail, rummaging through 
the victim’s garbage, stealing personal information in computer databases to the 
infiltration of organizations that store large amounts of personal information. 
 
Usually, breakdowns in customer privacy, consumer privacy, client confidentiality and 
political privacy make identity theft possible. In customer privacy situations, it is 
generally a company that leaked the data in first place. Consumer privacy is violated 
where credit card numbers or other generally useful identity data are stolen and the 
information is used much more widely. Client confidentiality and political privacy 
make it easy to effectively impersonate someone by using confidential information that 
a person would not ordinarily have access to.150
 
                                                 
149 James van Dyke founder of Javelin quoted on 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_theft#Objection_to_the_term  
150 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_theft  
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There are hardships associated with trying to restore the victim’s reputation in the 
community and correcting erroneous information for which the criminal is responsible. 
 
The common law crime of fraud will be examined to determine whether it will suffice 
to secure a conviction in this regard. 
 
6.2. 2 Elements of the Offence
     
   6.2 (i) Intention
   The intention required for the commission of this crime is dolus directus.  
 
   6.2 (ii) Unlawfulness
The unlawful element of the crime is defined by the fraudulent attempt to 
impersonate another person. 
 
 6.2.3 Common Law  
 
    6.2 (a) Fraud 
 
Fraud consists in unlawfully making a misrepresentation which causes 
actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to another. It is done 
with the intent to defraud 151  
 
                                                 
151 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 579 
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     Essential Elements of the crime 
     These are: (1) Unlawful (2) Misrepresentation (3) Prejudice (4) Intention 
 
(1) Unlawfully 
Authority, coercion or consent may conceivably remove the taint of 
illegality from an otherwise fraudulent misrepresentation by a person.152
 
(2) Misrepresentation 
Misrepresentation involves the deception or the misleading of the victim 
of the crime. Misrepresentation is an incorrect statement of fact or law 
made by one person to another. It may be conveyed in words or conduct. 
Examples of conduct that is construed as fraudulent conduct include 
tendering a document or credit card and withdrawing money from an 
automated teller machine.153  
 
(3) Prejudice 
The misrepresentation should cause actual prejudice or potential 
prejudicial to another.154 The prejudice caused may be proprietary or non-
proprietary. Furthermore, potential prejudice suffices.155
 
 
                                                 
152 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 581 
153 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 582 
154 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 579 
155 Burchell and Milton (n 58) 585 
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(4) Intention 
The perpetrator must have intention to defraud and should have intended 
for statement or conduct to be acted upon. The representations made 
should have been made knowingly156 or foreseeing157 that it might be 
false.  
 
Buckley J in Re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd. states 
following: 
 
“To deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which 
is false, and which the person practicing the deceit knows or 
believes to be false. To defraud is to deprive by deceit; it is by 
deceit to induce a man to act to his injury. More tersely it may be 
put that to deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind, and to 
defraud is by deceit to induce a course of action.”158
 
     6.2.3 (a) (i) Evaluation and Recommendations  
 
A person found making illicit use of another’s personal data could perhaps be 
charged under section 87 (2) of the ECT Act. It states the following: 
                                                 
156 Section 245 of the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977 assists the State in this regard. It provides 
that if it is proved that the accused made a false representation, it shall be deemed, unless the contrary is 
proved, that the accused knew the representation to be false. 
157 See Ex Parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 (3) SA 71 (T) 101–5  
158 Buckley J in Re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 728 Cf. S v Isaacs 1968 (2) 
SA 187 (D) 191 
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A person who performs any of the acts described in section 86 for the 
purpose of obtaining any unlawful advantage by causing fake data to be 
produced with the intent that it be considered or acted upon as if it were 
authentic, is guilty of an offence. 
 
It is argued that the courts should consider distinguishing between 
“identity theft” and “identity fraud”. “Identity theft” may be defined as the 
unauthorized access of the personal records of another. As discussed in the 
previous chapter of the paper, the words “unauthorized” and “access” 
would have to be clearly defined. Access to one’s records obtained by 
hacking or by other means such as compiling the personal data of the 
victim in contravention of section 50 of the ECT Act159 would be termed 
“identity theft”. The production of “fake data”160 would include conduct 
such as switching the perpetrator’s name with that of the victim’s on his or 
her identity document for example. The use of that counterfeit identity 
document would be termed “identity fraud”.161  
 
A brief appraisal of the common law seems to indicate that a person 
accused of identity fraud may be prosecuted with a measure of success. 
This is because the ingredients that make up the crime of fraud are the 
                                                 
159 Section 50 of the Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 governs the assembly and use of 
electronically collected personal information.  
160 Section 87 (2) Electronic Communications Act No. 25 of 2002 
161 James van Dyke founder of Javelin quoted on 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_theft#Objection_to_the_term  
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same or similar to those found in identity theft and identity fraud. These 
are the elements of unlawfulness, misrepresentation, prejudice and 
intention.  
Perhaps another option could be to use of our current criminal law 
provision in conjunction with section 50 of the ECT Act. Regardless of 
this tentative solution, it is nonetheless preferable to have identity theft 
and identity fraud provisions embodied in a single piece of legislation. A 
coalescence of the common law and the ECT Act may be too ‘messy’ for 
want of a better word. Therefore, it is recommended that South Africa 
adopt legislation that targets identity theft and identity fraud directly.162  
 
On another note, it is questionable whether legal action could be taken 
against an individual who merely harvested the personal information of 
another but did not actually use it. It is not certain whether our present 
criminal law is equipped to handle such a situation. It is put forward that 
this is one of the situations where the distinction between the terms 





                                                 
162 Para 1028 (a) (7) of the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act 18 USC of 1998 in the United 
States that targets identity theft specifically. Under this statute, knowing transferring and using without 
lawful authority a means of identification of another person with intent to commit any unlawful activity 
constitutes a violation of Federal law or felony. The commission of this crime carries a penalty of up to 15 
years imprisonment.   
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6.3 Cyber stalking 
 
Cyber stalking is a common offence. The Working to Halt Online Abuse organization 
(WHOA) aims to educate the internet community about online harassment. 
Comprehensive statistics on cyber stalking are not available. Consequently, in early 2000 
WHOA started asking victims for demographic information. The following statistics are 
based on the cases handled by the WHOA organization where the victims filled out the 
questionnaire as completely as possible. The figures below are not the total number of 
cases that the organization handled each year. These figures are as follows: 
 
196 cases for the calendar year 2004 
198 cases for the calendar year 2003 
218 cases for the calendar year 2002 
256 cases for the calendar year 2001 
353 cases for the calendar year 2000163
 
This part of the research paper attempts to make out a case for the criminalization of 
cyber stalking in South Africa. Reference to the common law will be made and an 




                                                 
163 Online harassment or cyber stalking statistics available at 
http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/index.shtml  
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 6.3.1 Definition of the Offence 
 
Cyber stalking is the use of the internet or other electronic means to stalk someone. 
This term is also known as online harassment and online abuse.164  
 
A cyber stalker does not present a direct physical threat to the victim. They 
characteristically target and harass their victims via websites, chat rooms, discussion 
forums, open publishing websites and email. However, the stalker does follow the 
victim’s online activity to gather information and to make threats or other forms of 
verbal intimidation by electronic means. The anonymity of online interaction reduces 
the chance of identifying the culprit. 165  
 
On the surface, cyber stalking might seem relatively harmless. However, it interferes 
with the individual’s privacy, emotional or psychological security and the freedom 
from being subjected to the control, coercion or intimidation of the stalker so as to be 






                                                 
164 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberstalking  
165 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberstalking  
166 South African Law Commission paper on Stalking (Project 130) Issue Paper 22 (2003) available at 
http://www.law.wits.ac.za/salc/issue/ip22.pdf  
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 6.3.2 Elements of the Offence 
   
  6.3.2 (i) Intention
An accused should be found guilty of this offence where he or she directly intended 
to harass another person. Willful blindness to the possibility of causing fear or anxiety 
to another person should also be taken into account. 
 
  6.3.2 (ii) Unlawfulness
It is suggested that the unlawfulness of the crime may be characterized by the 
intention to harass or stalk the victim.  
 
 6.3.3 Common Law 
 
The main problem is that South African criminal law does not seem to recognize 
stalking, let alone cyber stalking, as a crime in its own right. Existing criminal law 
focuses on the punishment of specific prohibited acts. Stalkers may engage in 
behaviour which is seemingly harmless and lawful when viewed in isolation.167 It is 
only where an aspect of stalking behaviour constitutes a criminal act that criminal law 
may be invoked to restrain or to punish the stalker. Criminal law therefore treats 
stalking as a precursor to a crime or as evidence of its mens rea but unfortunately not as 
a crime on its own.168  
 
                                                 
167 Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Report Stalking (2000) 7 
168 South African Law Commission(n 166) 
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The South African Law Commission looked into the issue of stalking in an issue paper 
released in 2003.169 It examined the crimes of common assault, assault with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm, crimen injuria, defamation, malicious injury to property, trespass 
to land to see whether an alleged stalker could be charged under any of these crimes. 
After an evaluation of the criminal law, the South African Law Commission concluded 
that traditional criminal law is inadequate. Prosecuting a stalker for trespassing, for 
example, will not necessarily provide a remedy unless the stalker enters the victim’s 
private property.170 Therefore, not much can be done to deter or to punish a stalker until 
he or she actually causes direct harm to a person or their property.171 In a bid to assist 
the victim, the police usually focus upon a particular aspect of the stalker’s conduct and 
seek to bring it within an existing provision of the criminal law. In short, existing 
criminal law covers some aspects of stalking behaviour. However, legislation is 
required so as to address stalking as well as cyber stalking as an independent 
phenomenon.172
 
   6.3.3 (i) Recommendations 
 
On the surface, cyber stalking might seem relatively harmless but it can cause 
victims psychological and emotional harm, and occasionally leads to actual 
stalking.173 The United States, Australian and the United Kingdom have enacted 
legislation targeting stalking. Seeing as our criminal law is insufficient, it is 
                                                 
169 South African Law Commission (n 166) 
170 South African Law Commission (n 166) 
171 Clark and Van der ‘Walt Stalking: Do We Need a Statute?’ (1998) 115 SALJ 729 at 731 
172 South African Law Commission (n 166) 
173 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberstalking  
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suggested that South Africa follow suit and criminalize stalking that takes place by 
electronic means such as the internet.  
 
Definitions are central to any piece of legislation. However, any definition put 
forward in the cyber stalking legislation should take into account the unique nature 
of interaction on the internet. The legislature should perhaps consider whether one’s 
email box qualifies as ‘private property’ per se. It is recommended that the 
legislature could define “premises” or the “vicinity” of an individual to include an 
email address.  
 
Intimidation should be defined as conduct amounting to harassment, repeated and 
unwanted or unsolicited electronic messages. The messages may be conveyed on a 
website or blog which the victim is known to frequent.174 It should be a requirement 
that the culprit had the intention to cause fear of harm or should have known that their 
conduct would cause fear. It is put forward that dolus directus or dolus indirectus 
should be the standard of intention the courts could use. The motive of the individual 
would be irrelevant as with other crimes. 
 
It is suggested that the relationship between stalking and sending spam makes for a 
fairly interesting topic of discussion. The question is whether sending unsolicited bulk 
(UBE) email to someone could qualify as stalking. The ECT Act criminalizes the 
                                                 
174 There may be some difficulty with this aspect of the definition seeing as websites and blogs are open to 
the public. 
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sending of unsolicited commercial email (UCE).175 However, there is no mention of 
unsolicited bulk email or the criminalization thereof. This raises the question of what 
legal recourse a person could have in a situation where they are the recipient of 




To sum up, the ECT Act does not criminalize certain undesirable conduct that takes place 
by electronic means. The ECT Act needs to address the issues of phishing, advance fee 
fraud, identity theft, identity fraud and cyber stalking directly. It is hoped that this section 
of the paper illustrated this point. In most instances, our current criminal law cannot 
adequately cover the offences that are taking place. This makes the prosecution of an 
accused particularly difficult.   
                                                 






An evaluation of the common law by the South African Law Commission illustrated that 
traditional criminal law is inadequate to deal with electronic crime. Section 86 of the 
Electronic Communications Act represents a fair attempt at criminalizing certain 
undesirable conduct that may be perpetrated by means of a computer. In the past, 
organized criminal syndicates targeted governments, businesses and home computer 
owners alike. The criminal law provisions signify the Legislature’s intention to bring 
these offenders to justice. However, as with almost any new piece of legislation, 
interpretation problems arise. It has been argued that the Legislature did not provide 
sufficient and in some cases, any guidance on the interpretation of certain words and 
phrases. Where this was the case, possible recommendations were made to aide with this 
problem. Assuming that the Legislature does not rectify the situation by clarifying the 
meaning of certain terms, it is probable that the courts will be tasked with coming up with 
appropriate definitions to fill in the gaps. 
 
Lastly, the Electronic Communications Act criminalizes some but not all the crimes that 
can be perpetrated by use of a computer. The crimes of phishing, advance fee fraud, 
identity theft and cyber stalking are a few of these crimes that were not included in the 
legislation. With our law as it stands, the extradition of a person accused of these 
activities may not be possible. This is because the successful prosecution of such an 
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accused can only take place if the crime is recognized in the country where the 
perpetrator or culprit is residing and in the country where he is accused of committing the 
crime. An examination of the common law shows that trying to secure the conviction of a 
person accused of these activities will be especially difficult. The deficit in our law can 
be remedied by an amendment of the ECT Act or by the creation of a new statute. Any 
amendments to the ECT Act should take into account the peculiarity of internet related 
activities. It is recommended that the legislature take the initiative and make up for the 
shortfall in the criminal law provisions of the current Electronic Communications Act. 
Alternatively, redefining and defining certain things could bring the objectionable 
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